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The origins of postmodern moral relativism
Gang Deng
Abstract: Postmodernism,	which	emerged	in	the	1960s,	involves	a	wide	
range of fields and carries out all-round critical reflections on 
the foundation, tradition and other aspects of the development 
of modern civilization. Postmodern morality came into being with 
the popularity of postmodernism in western countries. It features 
obvious	“de-universality”	and	provides	a	new	mirror	for	reflec-
tions on modern morality. Its progressive significance cannot be 
ignored. However, some postmodern moral concepts are becoming 
increasingly relativistic, even going to extremes, bringing about 
disturbances to society. Tracing the root of moral relativism back 
to ancient times based on the great history of its development, 
this study first sorts out the same gene of ancient Western mor-
al	relativism	–	using	“skepticism”	as	a	weapon	against	authority 
and dogmatism, and points out that the key of using moral rel-
ativism	lies	in	seeking	the	proper	limit	of	“skepticism”.	Then	
it draws forth the fact that postmodern morality started with 
“skepticism”	and	prevailed	because	of	its	“relativism”,	pointing	
out that some postmodern morality moved toward moral relativ-
ism	because	of	persistence	in	“skepticism”,	while	some	fall	into	
a	state	of	moral	nihility	by	radicalising	“skepticism”.	If	a	crafts-
man wants to do good work, he must first sharpen his tools. This 
study	concludes	with	suggestions	on	how	to	use	the	“skepticism”	
of postmodern morality.
Keywords: postmodern morality, moral and ethical relativism, skepti-
cism, extremalization
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Introduction
Relativism itself is a very complicated philosophy topic. 
Moral relativism is a special expression or individual case 
of relativism, the concept of which has not been defined 
exactly within academia. Postmodern morality learns from 
history,	attacks	on	all	sides	with	“skepticism”,	and	doubts	
everything, showing an obvious tendency toward relativism. 
To	illustrate	this	point,	it	has	been	stated	that:	“Morality	
arises when a group of people reach an implicit agreement 
or come to a tacit understanding about their relations with 
one	another”.1 Postmodern moral relativism carries out 
all-round criticism on the foundation, tradition and oth-
er aspects of the development of modern civilization, pro-
viding a new mirror for reflections on modern morality. It 
is progressive to some extent, but has exerted underesti-
mated negative influence as well. Tracing the great history 
of moral relativism, this study first sorts out the same gene 
of	ancient	western	moral	relativism	–	using	“skepticism”	
as a weapon against authority and dogmatism, and points 
out that the key of using moral relativism lies in seeking 
the	proper	limit	of	“skepticism”.	Then	it	presents	the	fact	
that	postmodern	morality	started	with	“skepticism”	and	pre-
vailed	because	of	its	“relativism”,	and	thus	points	out	that	
some postmodern morality moved toward moral relativism 
because	of	persistence	in	“skepticism”,	while	some	fall	into	
a	state	of	moral	nihility	by	extremizing	“skepticism”.	Final-
ly, this study offers suggestions on how to use the “skepti-
cism”	of	postmodern	morality.
1. The Origins of Ancient Western Moral Relativism
1.1. Extreme feelings
Protagoras	(circa	490	BC-420	BC)	was	an	early	ethical	rel-
ativist	thinker.	City-states	of	ancient	Greece	in	the	5th	cen-
tury	BC	embraced	highly	developed	democracy,	but	ancient	
1	 Gilbert	Harman,	“Moral	Relativism	Defended”,	Philosophical 
Review	1975,	vol.	84,	no.	1,	p.	3.
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Greek theology still prevailed. As a representative of soph-
ists, Protagoras was the first to doubt theology and advo-
cated	his	personal	feelings.	He	said:	“concerning	the	gods,	
I have no means of knowing whether they exist or not, 
nor of what sort they may be, because of the obscurity of the 
subject,	and	the	brevity	of	human	life.”	He	dared	to	question	
powerful gods and mainstream thoughts, denied the role 
of gods, fate or other supernatural forces in life, and strong-
ly supported the democracy of Athens, which had progres-
sive significance. He emphasized the significance of human 
beings as the subject of understanding objective thoughts, 
discounted supra-natural influences, and thus, it could be 
argued, established human dignity. Protagoras even advo-
cated	“personalized”	argumentation,	arguing	that	if	people	
use the methods of their opponent, then they cannot prove 
that they are better than others.2 Throughout his life, Pro-
tagoras lived in various places and was always respected. 
Unfortunately,	he	later	took	the	role	of	“personal	feelings”	
to the extreme and proposed that “man is the measure of all 
things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things 
that	are	not,	that	they	are	not”.	According	to	him,	everyone	
is the measure of all things. Then when people have differ-
ent opinions, there is no objective truth to determine who is 
right and who is wrong. This theory is essentially a relativ-
istic	way	of	thinking,	and	it	is	based	on	“deceptive”	feelings.	
Regarding feelings as the criterion of truth contains subjec-
tive idealism and ignores the role of morality and even law, 
which was not conducive to social stability at that time. The 
“extremalization”	of	Protagoras’s	relativism	also	brought	
him tragic consequences. His work On the Gods was burned 
and only a few fragments survived. He was expelled from 
Athens and then died on the way to Sicily.
1.2. Extremalization of contradictions between subjectivity and objectivity
Gorgias	(483	BC-375	BC)	put	forward	skeptical	proposi-
tions and systematized contradictions between subjec-
tivity and objectivity. The main contents include three 
2 Plato, Plato Complete Works	(vol.	1),	trans.	by	Wang	Xiaochao,	
People’s	Publishing	House,	Beijing	2017,	p.	458.
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propositions	–	nothing	exists;	even	if	something	exists,	noth-
ing can be known about it; and even if something can be 
known about it, knowledge about it can’t be communicated 
to others. He opposed the arbitrary authority of Parmenides 
of	Elea’s	ontology	with	these	three	revolutionary	proposi-
tions by profoundly exposing the contradictions between 
thinking and existence, and systematically laying out the 
contradictions between subjectivity and objectivity, between 
thinking and existence, and between language and thought. 
From this we can see that skepticism has always come from 
opposition to dogmatism. In the history of philosophy, Gor-
gias’ three propositions have been discussed repeatedly 
and gained certain progressive significance. However, it is 
unfortunate that he took the “contradictions between sub-
jectivity	and	objectivity”	to	the	extreme.	He	believed	that	
“knowledge	is	subjective	and	relative”	and	took	this	up	as	
his	imperative	to	demonstrate	that	“there	is	nothing”.	His	
view was extreme and directly manifested nihility. Accord-
ing to Gorgias, if communication between two people is pos-
sible, the listener and the speaker must be in the same state 
of	mind,	which	is	actually	never	impossible.	Likewise,	if	we	
are to know what is outside the mind, the mind must be 
the same as the outside world. So, it is impossible to know 
what is outside the mind and to convey knowledge accu-
rately	from	one	person	to	another.	Extremalizing	the	con-
tradictions between subjectivity and objectivity is a kind 
of sophistry, which was regarded by Aristotle as mislead-
ing and deceiving the public. Under its influence, morali-
ty has no standards or even contents, and becomes a kind 
of nihilistic morality.
1.3. The skeptical Pyrrho
Pyrrho	(circa	360	BC-circa	270	BC),	who	took	dogmatism	
as enemy and sincerely believed in skepticism, saw dogma-
tism as the greatest threat. With skepticism as the meth-
od, he established thinking direction and principle, and 
applied this principle to practice. He introduced skepticism 
into philosophy as a theoretical form. He did not formulate 
a relatively systematic theory, but only laid the foundation 
of skeptics. Pyrrho’s skepticism is indeed a rebellion against 
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the dogmatism of natural philosophy, which made him the 
chief representative of ancient Greek skepticism. Howev-
er, Pyrrho took skepticism to the extreme. He believed that 
each proposition can be opposed by an opposite proposi-
tion and that both had the same value and effectiveness 
and thus all claims cannot be established. This is outright 
skepticism. He exaggerated the relativity of feelings and 
cognition and although he did acknowledge the existence 
of phenomenon, he denied its reality. He believed that we 
can neither judge our feelings to be neither true or false, 
and therefore advocated epoche on all matters. This deep-
ly entrenched skepticism led Pyrrho to be even skeptical 
about his own skepticism. This kind of skepticism is diffi-
cult to justify itself and therefore results in another kind 
of dogmatism. It does not believe in anything and does 
not make any judgments and perceives the outside world 
as completely irrelevant to its own, so as to maintain inner 
peace. Therefore, it can be viewed as being seriously out 
of touch with reality and it could be argued that such moral-
ity	without	“judgment”,	only	“skepticism”,	would	never	lead	
to practical moral enforcement.
1.4. Aenesidemus’ personal feelings
Aenesidemus	(1st	century	BC-?)	was	one	of	the	representa-
tives who inherited Pyrrho’s ideas. He put forward the “Ten 
Tropes	for	Epoche”,	namely:	(1)	Different	creatures	manifest	
different	modes	of	perception.	(2)	Similar	differences	are	seen	
among individual people. (3) For the same person, informa-
tion	perceived	with	the	senses	is	self-contradictory.	(4)	Fur-
thermore, it varies from time to time with physical changes. 
(5)	In	addition,	this	data	differs	according	to	local	relations.	
(6)	Objects	are	known	only	indirectly	through	such	medi-
ums	as	air,	moisture,	etc.	(7)	These	objects	are	in	a	condi-
tion of perpetual change in colour, temperature, size and 
motion. (8) All perceptions are relative and interact one upon 
another.	(9)	Our	impressions	become	less	critical	through	
repetition	and	custom.	(10)	All	men	are	brought	up	with	dif-
ferent beliefs, under different laws and social conditions. It 
is not difficult to see that he extremalized personal feelings. 
In this way, the relationship between individuals and society 
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will exist only in name and morality is thus nothing. Moral-
ity that relativizes everything and only recognizes personal 
feelings cannot have similar moral enforcement goals and 
will only bring about social chaos in the end.
1.5. The unattainable truth
Sextus	Empiricus	(160	AD-210	AD)	was	a	Greek	doctor	and	
philosopher. Although he was not an empiricist in philoso-
phy, he was the last representative of ancient skepticism. 
He defined the basic principle of skepticism as “for every 
reasoning	there	is	an	equal	and	opposite	reasoning”.	These	
two should neither be affirmed as true nor denied as false, 
because we did not know, nor could we know, which one was 
right.3 He pointed out in his works that people’s feelings con-
tradict each other, thoughts contradict each other, and feel-
ings contradict thoughts. The so-called self-evident axiom is 
only	hypothesis	and	its	opposite	is	equally	possible	–	there-
fore, truth cannot be attained. These conflicts and contradic-
tions are therefore quite disturbing. So, this suggests that 
only by adopting a skeptical attitude, making no judgment 
and	putting	an	end	to	all	beliefs	–	can	peace	be	achieved.	
Empiricus	applied	his	works	to	refute	the	theories	of	differ-
ent schools, which had certain progressive significance and 
so	enriched	the	diversity	of	cognition.	But	he	pushed	the	con-
tradictions and conflicts in reality to the extreme and came 
to	the	conclusion	that	“truth	cannot	be	attained”,	a	typical	
negative skepticism, making his claim a reflection of the 
frustration of those in decline.
1.6. The “silence” of moral relativism in the Middle Ages
When it came to the Middle Ages, people advocated “love for 
God	is	the	source	of	all	power”,	combined	the	ancient	“four	
virtues”	with	the	religious	“three	Christian	virtues”,	held	
humility for God and patience for the world, and also car-
ried out asceticism, self-contempt and self-denial. Morality 
was engraved with religious elements and therefore could 
be said to have become hypocritical. Social morality was 
3	 Peter	Burke,	Montaigne,	trans.	by	Sun	Naixiu,	China	Social	Sci-
ences	Press,	Beijing	1992,	p.	25.
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led to the relationship between man and God and provid-
ed people with spiritual comfort while completely enslav-
ing the masses. Moral relativism and all other statements 
and thoughts contrary to sacred religion were completely 
suppressed.	The	“unification”	of	religious	morality	made	it	
easy for people to be controlled and convenient for the rule 
of religion and feudal lords. As no questioning was allowed, 
it	is	not	difficult	to	understand	there	was	a	“silence”	of	mor-
al relativism in the Middle Ages.
2. The Commonalities of Ancient Western Moral Relativism
Western moral relativism is neither an independent ethi-
cal school nor a particular era in moral thought, but a long-
term and universal tendency reflected in the developmental 
history of western moral thought. It brings together many 
ideological figures and theoretical schools spread through-
out the entire history of the development of western moral 
thought.	Born	in	ancient	Greece,	it	was	“silent”	in	the	Mid-
dle	Ages	in	Europe	but	flourished	increasingly	in	the	mod-
ern and postmodern age. Although western moral relativism 
thoughts showed different modes in different historical peri-
ods,	there	were	some	commonalities,	mainly	as	follows:	
(1)	Skepticism	in	what	has	no doubt; challenge absoluteness 
and hegemony with skepticism as a shield and sensibility as 
a spear. Their thoughts were, on the whole, characterized by 
“anti-center,	irrationality,	and	uncertainty”.	(2)	In	the	ini-
tial stage of skepticism, they gained a great deal of sympa-
thy and obtained many advocates. Relativism is most likely 
to take root in the period when social thoughts are active or 
social history is in transition. (3) Western moral relativist 
thoughts easily turned from skeptical to extreme, from indi-
vidual personality to confrontation and from pluralist to dis-
persion	and	finally	–	nihilism.	Nihility	and	nihilism	bring	
moral bankruptcy, chaos and instability, which is not allowed 
by	rulers	or	even	the	general	public.	(4)	The	activity	of	moral	
relativism is inversely proportional to the management and 
control on social thought.
It is particularly noteworthy that for the moral relativ-
ism	of	each	period,	if	it	is	“excessively	skeptical”	and	goes	
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to extremes, it can easily bring chaos to the concerned soci-
ety.	The	reasons	are	as	follows:	(1)	The	danger	of	relativ-
ism	lies	not	in	“relativism”,	but	in	denying	the	possibility	
of	mutual	evaluation	of	values	with	“relativism”.	Because	
relativism tends to exaggerate subjectivity, absolutize rela-
tivism,	and	lead	“suspicion”	to	extremes,	thereby	neglecting	
or even denying everything that exists objectively. Since eth-
ical life and moral standards are relative, nothing is high-
er	or	lower	and	no	one	is	right	or	wrong.	(2)	If	individuals	
infinitely	magnify	desires	under	the	disguise	of	“skepticism”,	
it is bound to lead to the reversion (social disorganization) 
of human civilization, and finally to moral nihility. With-
out morality, the law of the jungle will reappear, which is 
against the original intention of human civilization. (3) Rel-
ativism is like a group of improvisational, free and roman-
tic	knights	who	ride	the	horse	of	“skepticism”	and	go	on	
a rampage with inexhaustible hormones and insuppressible 
rebellious emotions. They sometimes do something good, and 
sometimes get into trouble.
3. The Reappearance of Postmodern Moral Relativism
Many scholars believe that postmodernism is a continua-
tion and development of modernism. Although postmodern 
morality only began to gain ground in the public conscious-
ness	during	the	1960s,	relativism	in	postmodern	morality	
can be traced back even earlier. From the perspective of his-
torical development, the freedom pursued by postmodern 
moral relativism opposes traditional moral authority and 
moral tyranny. As for individuals and different groups, mor-
al freedom provides a variety of moral development goals 
for people and fully meets the social and historical needs 
of development from the closed and unified Middle Ages 
to modern society.
3.1. The re-emergence of moral relativism in the Renaissance
The	Renaissance	from	the	middle	of	the	14th	century	to	the	
beginning	of	the	17th	century,	also	known	as	the	period	
of first modernity, advocated the liberation of human subjec-
tivity	and	the	revival	of	skepticism.	In	the	mid	16th	century,	
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a college student named Petrus Ramus first attacked Aris-
totle on epistemology and was recognized as a skeptic. Guy 
de	Bruès,	a	young	lawyer,	imitated	and	developed	Cicero’s	
On Scholasticism, and mainly discussed knowledge and 
legal	relativity.	In	1576,	the	philosopher	Francisco	Sanchez	
(1523–1601)	wrote	an	essay	Nothing Is Known, in which he 
strongly criticized Aristotle and logicians in the Middle Ages 
ad ancient times. Francisco Sanchez’s contemporary, Michel 
de	Montaigne	(1533–1592),	wrote	prose	to	stress	various	
human ideas and their consequent unreliability. “It is impos-
sible	to	find	two	opinions	exactly	alike”.4 It is the principle 
of Montaigne’s thought and doctrine to doubt everything 
and not make judgments, which leads to the reappearance 
of Pyrrho’s thought. Moral relativism in the Renaissance 
was not popular but was a further supplement to the deni-
al of theocracy, and a kind of beneficial thinking after the 
liberation of human nature. It promoted the enlightenment 
of human nature and had great significance for social prog-
ress.	Skepticism	is	an	attempt	to	find	an	“absolute	truth”	
that transcends personal senses, universal opinions, and 
even scientific or mathematical theories. While the authen-
ticity of all human cognition can be reasonably questioned, 
only	the	authenticity	of	“I”	as	the	thinking	subject	cannot	
be questioned. In the history of western moral philosophy, 
“I	think”	as	the	foundation	of	moral	philosophy	had	revolu-
tionary	significance	and	thus,	Descartes	came	to	us.
3.2. The skeptical debate in the age of Enlightenment
The	subjectivity	of	“I	think”	determines	Descartes’	choice	
of	“moral	noumenon”.	In	Descartes’	opinion,	“moral	nou-
menon”	exists	in	“spiritual	entity”,	instead	of	“God	enti-
ty”,	the	“idea	of	good”	or	the	abstract	“principle	of	reason”.	
Therefore, it could be argued that individual subjective 
thinking determines moral spirit. Grasping the relation-
ship between individual subjective thinking and moral nou-
menon is a crucial link and element to understand the form 
and	structure	of	Descartes’	moral	philosophy.	The	internal	
structure	of	the	form	of	Descartes’	moral	philosophy	can	be	
4	 P.	Burke,	op.	cit.,	p.	31.
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expressed	as	a	“three-dimensional”	structure:	“spirit	enti-
ty”	–	“moral	freedom”	–	“subjectivity	of	‘I	think’”.	Kant’s	
(1724–1804)	ethical	thought	belongs	to	rationalistic	eth-
ics,	which	can	be	summarized	as	follows:	people’s	moral	
life must be subject to a kind of principle, and this principle 
does not exist outside of people, but within their reason. All 
kinds of rationalistic ethics have a common view, that is, 
to	understand	“sovereign	good”	as	a	principle	higher	than	
the individual. This kind of morality believes that people’s 
moral	behavior	obeys	the	order	of	reason.	During	the	second	
modernity	period	(the	age	of	Enlightenment),	reason	alone	
had its hegemony and reason was superior to everything. 
In	the	era	of	Logos,	there	was	no	God,	no	sensitive	people,	
but only empty reasoning. Hume said, “so that when you 
pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean 
nothing but that, from the constitution of your nature, you 
have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contempla-
tion	of	it.”5 What Hume did was to criticize and exclude the 
absolute	leadership	of	“transcendental	reason”	in	the	con-
struction	of	moral	philosophy	on	the	basis	of	“experience”	
and	“observation”.	Hume	reduced	“reason”	from	“the	mas-
ter	of	the	passions”	to	“the	slave	of	the	passions”.	“Reason	
is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them.”	Moreover,	when	it	comes	to	Berkeley,	people	will	
think	of	his	statement;	“esse	est	percipi”	(to	be	is	to	be	per-
ceived). It means that the reason why something exists is 
that the composite idea of something is perceived by the 
subject.	Berkeley’s	subjective	relativism	is	the	completion	
of	Locke’s	empiricism.	It	can	be	said	that	thorough	empir-
icism is necessarily subjective relativism. No wonder that 
in	the	19th	century,	all	traditional	philosophy	of	empiricism	
was subjective idealism. In summary, relativistic ethics rep-
resented	by	Hume	and	Berkeley	launched	the	debate	on	
absolutistic	ethics	represented	by	Kant	and	others,	which	
is	also	a	manifestation	of	the	increasingly	strong	“voice”	
of moral relativism in modern times.
5	 David	Hume,	A Treatise of Human Nature, trans. by Guan Wen-
yun,	revised	by	Zheng	Zhixiang,	The	Commercial	Press,	Beijing	2018,	
p.	505.
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3.3. Reflections on the era intertwined with beauty and ugliness
From	the	mid-19th	century	to	the	end	of	the	World	War	II,	
social conditions were disappointing. The world was filled 
with wars, killings, capital, gap of wealth and anomie. From 
the standpoint of the will to power, Nietzsche held that the 
European	civilization	was	on	the	decline	and	human	beings	
were gradually degenerating. The root of the problem lied 
in	Christian	civilization.	Nietzsche	claimed	that	“God	is	
dead”,	which	appeared	in	his	The Gay Science for three times 
and later in his famous work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Tradi-
tional morality, he thought, with its powerful inertial force, 
deprived people of the ability to judge good and evil and let 
them be lazy to make moral judgment. “When I came to men, 
then	I	found	them	resting	on	an	old	infatuation:	all	of	them	
thought they had long known what was good and bad for 
men.”6 Nietzsche’s contribution to ethics is his attempt to find 
a third way above religious asceticism, modern utilitarianism 
and	hedonism.	Only	by	not	blindly	following	the	consensus	
of the public, not blindly following the subjectivity of public 
interests, not following the subjectivity of traditional inter-
ests, and not following the path of traditional mediocrity, 
can a person truly strive to give full play to the subjectivity 
of his own interests, find the meaning of his life, and invent 
his own correct moral life. From these we can see Nietzsche’s 
skeptical spirit. He did not follow the certainty of absolute 
authority or believe in the absolute myth of collectivism. The 
subjectivity of interests as understood by Nietzsche is the sub-
jectivity of individual interests, instead of the subjectivity 
of public interests. He believed that there was no subjectiv-
ity of human interests, but only the subjectivity of individ-
ual interests. Although these efforts were not successful, he 
raised enlightening questions for human beings, which great-
ly influenced the development of postmodernism, especially 
the further development of relativism. He put forward a kind 
of real morality which promotes human nature and bene-
fits human development, namely the superhuman morality. 
Nietzsche’s morality is characterized by moral innovation and 
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, God Is Dead. Selected Writings of Nietzsche, 
trans.	by	Qi	Ren.	Joint	Publishing	House	Press,	Shanghai	1989,	p.	122.
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some elements of old morality, including relativity. Just like 
being in the transition from rational modernism to postmod-
ernism and then new postmodern morality.
4. Some Relativism Tendency and Extreme Expression in Postmodern Morality
Postmodernists	believe	that	since	the	Enlightenment,	rea-
son development led by rationalism has been transformed 
into instrumental rationality, and that the sacred mission 
of human beings to pursue mind freedom and liberation has 
been dominated by scientific and technological civilization, 
thus resulting in alienation and materialization. Therefore, 
postmodernism rejects the ideas of wholeness, certainty, uni-
versality and unity pursued by modernity and emphasizes 
opposite arguments such as difference, uncertainty, diversi-
fication, local theory and dynamics. When modernity comes 
to self-criticism and self-demolition, the path followed by many 
previous ethical theories starts to look like a blind path, and 
at the same time, the door is opened to the possibility of a rad-
ical and novel understanding of moral phenomena.7 Therefore, 
people	put	their	hopes	on	“new	reformers”	(postmodernism).	
In general, postmodern morality holds an incredulous attitude 
towards logical concept and structural interpretation. Histor-
ical experience shows that this kind of attitude easily leads 
people to their lack of desire for thoughts, things and external 
feelings, thereby resulting in relativism. The result is often 
that, except skepticism, their thoughts are almost frozen. 
They are sometimes like wandering and aimless reformers, 
riding the horse of skepticism to go on a rampage, achieving 
nothing and only doubting everything.
4.1. The destructive power of relativism and the reduction of moral universality
Emphasis	on	moral	universality	is	the	basic	characteristic	
and argument pillar of western modern ethics, but the reali-
ty of modern society is cruel. Science and technology created 
by man in turn control man’s thoughts, behavior and cultural 
7	 Zygmunt	Bauman,	Postmodern Ethics,	trans.	by	Zhang	Cheng-
gang,	Jiangsu	People’s	Publishing	House,	Jiangsu	2003,	p.	2.
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life. Man has to exchange rich external material benefits for 
inner spiritual degradation, leading to man as being alienat-
ed. Thus, it could be argued that the result of modern moral-
ity is disappointing. The rationality and legitimate crisis 
of western modern ethnics provide an opportunity for the rise 
of postmodern ethics in the west. Postmodernism is famous 
for its skepticism about scientific rationality and is highly 
expected. While destroying the edifices of western modern 
ethics, western postmodern ethics drives modern morality 
away from the altar of universality and unity and reduces it 
to the facts of human’s moral life, such as diversified moral 
experience, extensive moral divergence and profound mor-
al and cultural difference, and thoroughly particularizes it. 
“Most people’s values reflect conventions that are maintained 
by	continual	tacit	bargaining	and	adjustment.”8 It advocates 
diversified moral experience, extensive moral divergence and 
profound moral and cultural difference, which are seemingly 
new and thus popular among the people. It exists in people’s 
expectations,	as	if	it	has	become	the	great	“savior”	to	“save	the	
mess	left	by	modernism	morality”.	Unfortunately,	postmod-
ern morality is overjoyed and overproud, it questions every-
thing, even itself, and going to the extreme of relativism. The 
result must be the reduction of moral universality. The main 
manifestation is that morality is no longer the essential need 
of human beings. Without moral principle of universal effec-
tiveness, there is no fundamental standard to judge the good 
and evil nature of human behavior, let alone moral practice.
4.2. The discourse power of relativism and the contextualization of moral norms
The	most	glorious	“debut”	and	“power	claim”	of	postmod-
ernism trend after the World War II also enabled relativ-
ism	to	secure	and	all-round	“status”	in	many	varied	realms,	
such as; politics, economy, culture, thought, philosophy, 
folk custom etc. It was unbeatable. The relativism ten-
dency in postmodern morality was increasingly prevalent. 
“Our	age	is	often	called	the	age	of	relativism.”9 Postmodern 
8	 G.	Harman,	„Responses	to	Critics”,	Philosophy and Phenomeno-
logical Research	1998,	vol.	58,	no.	1,	p.	164.
9	 Luther	J.	Binkley,	Conflict of Ideals,	trans.	by	Ma	Yuande	et	al.,	
The	Commercial	Press,	Beijing	1983,	p.	6.
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relativism morality holds that people’s moral concepts, mor-
al judgments and moral choices should be judged complete-
ly	according	to	the	“context”	within	a	specific	time,	and	that	
the result of such judgment is inevitably based on a specif-
ic context as the starting point of theory and practice. This 
is obviously one-sided and mechanical, because it only sees 
individual particularity in the specific moral situation and 
ignores the existence of a universal and valuable moral prac-
tice in the great history of human society. In the west, the 
values clarification school can be the best example of follow-
ing	moral	relativism.	As	said	by	Dewey	in	his	book	Moral 
Principles in Education, morality is generated by adapting 
to the context, and one kind of morality is good for one envi-
ronment, but not for others. This kind of moral cognition 
and moral judgment is separate from individual personali-
ty and moral self. And this separation leads to the fact that 
although a person may have good moral cognition and moral 
judgment, he may not know a choice in what kind of context 
is a moral choice and a behavior in what kind of context is 
a moral behavior. If moral judgment departs from people’s 
moral quality, it is likely to deviate from the construction 
of	moral	self.	If	we	advocate	a	normative	“contextualized”	
morality,	when	people	face	the	ever-changing	“context”	
in society, they can only make their own decisions, and the 
consequences can be disastrous.
4.3. The extremalization of relativism and the thorough differentiation of moral values
As	Steven	Lukes	puts	it,	moral	relativism	remains	attrac-
tive because, in fact, it acknowledges the idea that there is 
no single best way to live one’s life.10 Since there is no single 
best way to live, it is up to the individual to decide which way 
to live. MacIntyre believed that the crisis of modern morali-
ty and modern society lied in the radicalisation of moral rel-
ativism, and that the loss of traditional human virtue lead 
to the loss of objective and impersonal moral standards. The 
price of moral actors’ liberation from the external authority 
of traditional morality is that any so-called moral words 
10	 Steven	Lukes,	Moral Relativism,	trans.	by	Chen	Rui,	China	
Legal	Publishing	House,	Beijing	2013,	p.	158.
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of the new self-discipline actors lose all authoritative con-
tents. All moral actors can express themselves without being 
constrained by the authority of the law of external Gods, the 
teleology of nature, or hierarchy.11	Extreme	moral	relativ-
ism believes that all morality is relative, value is subjective 
and individualized, morality is a personal matter and that 
everyone’s independent value choice has legitimacy. This 
kind of morality will inevitably bring about the complete dif-
ferentiation of social value and bring more accidental and 
ambiguous experiences to people, which can easily cause 
moral loss and moral decay, something worth reflecting on.
In the view of values clarification school, what matters 
is the formation of value and the process of obtaining val-
ue, rather than what kind of value is right and what kind 
of value should be cultivated for students. The burden of eth-
ical choices is being placed on individuals more than ever.12 
Extreme	relativism	or	skepticism	holds	that	the	control	over	
power is ineffective and should be opposed, and that the 
ultimate source of moral value is not the basis of culture or 
reason but the individual. The existence of any impersonal, 
universal and objective moral authority will lose its legitima-
cy basis, value will be thoroughly differentiated, and moral 
thought will eventually transform into nihility. There is no 
doubt that relativism value, if it is true and believed, will 
plunge people into mental confusion and an extremely dan-
gerous political game.13 This is the internal pain that mor-
al relativism itself cannot overcome.
5. Looking Back on History, the Tree of Skepticism Is Evergreen
Adhering to skepticism is a prominent feature of relativ-
ism, but postmodernists should not advocate unbridled skep-
ticism or encourage extreme relativism. In general, many 
postmodern western ethicists do not deny the normative 
11 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue,	trans.	by	Gong	Qun	et	al.,	Chi-
na	Social	Sciences	Press,	Beijing	1985,	p.	87.
12	 David	Lyon,	Postmodernity, trans. by Guo Weigui, Jilin People’s 
Publishing	House,	Jilin	2004,	p.	7.
13	 Allan	Bloom,	The Closing of the American Mind, trans. by Mu 
Qing	et	al.,	China	Social	Sciences	Press,	Beijing	1994,	p.	156.
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nature of morality, “It is compatible with moral relativ-
ism for certain moral claims to hold in relation to all moral 
frameworks just as certain claims about motion hold in all 
spatio-temporal	frameworks”14, which is worth affirming. 
But	if	relativists	push	skepticism	to	the	extreme,	simply	
deny everything and ignore the existence of others, it is 
not appropriate morality. Morality is supposed to guide peo-
ple to make a right choice, but it becomes impossible under 
extreme relativism. What’s more, once ethics and moral 
education no longer pay attention to the substantial val-
ue of morality, the pursuit of excellent quality will lose its 
legitimacy in the moral system, and the indoctrination val-
ue of moral education will be difficult to realize. The skep-
ticism advocated by relativism is of progressive significance 
and is a necessary weapon to deconstruct one-way hegemo-
ny. However, just as alcohol is to people, this concept should 
be used appropriately, otherwise, it can cause harm.
Skepticism is a science, or even the beginning of an inno-
vative inquiry, but it is by no means a simple denial. Just 
skepticism is not a sin and should be encouraged, even 
approved. Skepticism is a state of mind. It is supervision, 
inspection, reflection and feedback in actions. Skepticism 
can be a germinating seed and a channel for innovation. 
Morality is always the dialectical unity of relativity (par-
ticularity) and absoluteness (universality). The relativi-
ty of morality implies the absoluteness of morality. Moral 
norms and customs are historical, national and contempo-
rary, which is inevitable for all morality, and this is the rela-
tivistic	side	of	morality.	But	relativity	(particularity)	always	
implies absoluteness (universality). Rousseau once said, look 
at	the	nations	of	the	world	and	look	at	the	history:	in	many	
unnatural and weird worship forms, in many different cus-
toms and habits, you can find the same moral principle and 
the same idea of good and evil everywhere. Today, with glo-
balized social development and increasing promotion of indi-
vidual freedom in postmodernism, supporters of postmodern 
morality should remember that while advocating individu-
ation, they cannot ignore the universality of moral particu-
larity.	Only	when	we	strike	a	balance	between	relativity	and	
14	 G.	Harman,	„Responses	to	Critics”,	p.	209.
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absoluteness can we make our skepticism benefit human 
civilization and the tree of skepticism remains evergreen.
6. Conclusion
Although the relativism tendency of postmodern morality 
is by no means useless, it can go to the extreme very easily. 
People must be cautious in this regard. Appropriate relativ-
ism is conducive to the cultivation of individual and group 
moral freedom. It enables us to adopt an open-minded and 
flexible attitude, helps people of different nations, cultures 
and social systems form an atmosphere of mutual respect, 
mutual understanding and mutual tolerance and facilitates 
equal exchanges between different cultures. However, on the 
one hand, postmodern morality is faced with the challenges 
of value individualism and moral relativism tendency there-
of. If relativism is further extreme, it can go from “skepti-
cism”	to	moral	“nihility”.	On	the	other	hand,	if	social	moral	
education excessively takes moral relativism as the theoret-
ical support for its existence and development and pursues 
extreme value neutrality, instead of value-led personal integ-
rity and mission, the final consequence is usually that mor-
al education loses moral quality and the nature of spiritual 
education and moral education may become non-moral. The 
dialectical unity of moral absoluteness and relativity requires 
people to adhere to the moral development goal of “harmoni-
ous	coexistence”,	learn	from	each	other,	enhance	consensus	
and make efforts to form effective universal ethics.
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